The editing of the correspondence of major figures in intellectual history is an essential scholarly activity. Yet in this country in recent years it has neither been the priority it should be, nor has it received the support that it deserves. Of course there have been exceptions to this, perhaps notably – for the early modern period – the epic one-man effort of Esmond de Beer in his later years in producing The Correspondence of John Locke (though this regrettably, (...) and frustratingly, lacks a composite index). A further exception, the edition of The Correspondence of Henry Oldenburg by A. R. and M. B. Hall, was unfortunately flawed by the need to change publishers midway in the series, which has led to a marked disparity in the availability of the latter part of the set compared with its early volumes. In any case, like the Locke edition, this was conceived in the heady days of the 1960s and early 1970s, and few have ventured such enterprises since. Virtually the only exception is Noel Malcolm's edition of the manageable-sized Correspondence of Thomas Hobbes (two volumes, 1994). Moreover, it is revealing of the acute need to justify the publication of such material felt by editors and publishers alike that the promotional leaflet for this edition went so far as to claim that it was ‘one of the most important scholarly publications of the twentieth century’ – a claim that is the more ironic in view of the quite significant shortcomings in its method of presenting the material that it contains. (shrink)

How can a persisting object change whilst remaining the same object? Lewis, who frames this as the problem of temporary intrinsics, presents us with the perdurance solution: objects persist by having temporal parts which may have differing properties. And in doing so he characterises the opposing view as persisting but not by having temporal parts – a view he calls endurance. But this dichotomous picture of Lewis, although now widely embraced, misses out the orthodox historic view – a view I (...) call temporal holism: objects persist by having temporal parts to which they are ontologically prior. (In the perduring solution, by contrast, the temporal parts are ontologically prior.) This paper sets out this temporal holist solution and makes clear its differences from perdurantist and endurantist solutions. Although temporal holism has a long and illustrious history, this history has not been explicitly recognised. I begin the task of recognising this history in this paper, in order to make clear the nature of temporal holism, and to show that it is a long-established, well supported and distinctive position. The paper sets out, too, how temporal holism solves other ontological problems so that, despite its current neglect, temporary holism has the potential to greatly enrich contemporary philosophical debates. (shrink)

Someone who has more sympathy with traditional empiricism than with much of present-day philosophy may ask himself: 'How do my experiences give rise to my beliefs about an external world, and to what extent do they justify them?' He wants to refer, among other things, to unremarkable experiences, of a sort which he cannot help believing to be so extremely common that it would be ridiculous to call them common experiences. He mainly has in mind sense-experiences, and he thinks of (...) them in a particular way. His way of thinking of them, roughly speaking as something 'inner', is one on which recent logico-linguistic philosophy has thrown a good deal of light. The relevant special notion of an experience contrasts, among other things, with a certain more general biographical notion of an experience, which some dictionaries indicate by the definition, 'an event of which one is the subject'. This book explores the concept of experiences, focusing on the disjunctions between perception and illusion. (shrink)

Traces the development of the idea of experience (Greek peira, empeiria) in Greek thought, from its origins in the Presocratics, through Aristotle and subsequent Peripatetics (Theophrastus, Alexander of Aphrodisias), to Galen. Particular emphasis is placed on the ideas of the medical school of the Empirics, who based their theory and practice on experience and memory. This experience-based epistemology can be traced back to the “epistemic modesty” characteristic of Archaic Greek thought. Some passages in Avicenna, redolent of Sufism, which react to (...) perceived shortcomings in the Aristotelian theory of cognition and demonstration (especially the ineffability of individuals) may have been influenced by the medical Empirist tradition. This emphasis on experience, shared by Archaic Greek thought, medical Empirism, and by certain aspects of Buddhism, may have influenced Islamic Sufism, and hence the thought of Avicenna and his successors. (shrink)

The ArgumentErnst Cassirer's fundamental conception of symbolism (symbolic pregnance) derives from what may be called a bio-medical model of semiotics, not a linguistic one. He employs both models in his philosophy of symbolic forms, but his notion of the “prototype and model of symbolism” was not derived from linguistics. The sources for his conception of symbolism include the ethnographic and anthropological literature he discovered in Aby Warburg's (1866–1929) Hamburg research library, findings of medical research on aphasia and related conditions, particularly (...) the work of Kurt Goldstein (1878–1965) and the theoretical biology of Jacob von Uexküll (1864–1944). The linguistic model of semiotics regards the bond between the signifier and the signified as purely arbitrary and conventional, but Cassirer traced meaning back to a “natural symbolism” of image-like configurations in bodily feeling and perception. In this way, his doctrine of symbolism assumed a form that undercut the distinction between philosophical Naturalism and Idealism. This helps to explain why in later years Cassirer developed his theory of Basic Phenomena. Cassirer's notion of the “prototype and model of symbolism” illustrates his method of thought, which eschews pure argument in favor of interaction with empirical research. (shrink)

The theorems of the propositional calculus and the predicate calculus are stated, and the analogous principles of Boolean Algebra are identified. Also, the primary principles of modal logic are stated, and a procedure is described for identifying their Boolean analogues.

A system is counterentropic to the extent that it has a fractal structure and entropic to the extent that it doesn't.

If S is any well-formed and significant question or command having the form "...the phi...", Russell's Theory of Descriptions entails (i) that S is syntactically ambiguous, and (ii) that there is at least one disambiguation of S that is syntactically ill-formed. Given that each of (i) and (ii) is false, so is the Theory of Descriptions.

In his final book, renowned philosopher Pierre Hadot explores Goethe’s relationship with ancient spiritual exercises—transformative acts of intellect, imagination, or will. Goethe sought both an intense experience of the present moment as well as a kind of cosmic consciousness, both of which are rooted in ancient philosophical practices. These practices shaped Goethe’s audacious contrast to the traditional maxim memento mori (Don’t forget that you will die) with the aim of transforming our ordinary consciousness. Ultimately, Hadot reveals how Goethe cultivated a (...) deep love for life that brings to the forefront a new maxim: Don’t forget to live. (shrink)

Critical realism has been an important advance in social science methodology because it develops a qualitative theory of causality which avoids some of the pitfalls of empiricist theories of causality. But while there has been ample work exploring the relationship between critical realism and qualitative research methods there has been noticeably less work exploring the relationship between dialectical critical realism and qualitative research methods. This seems strange especially since the founder of the philosophy of critical realism, Roy Bhaskar, employs and (...) develops a range of dialectical concepts in his later work in order to extend the main tenets of critical realism. The aim of this paper is to draw on Bhaskar's later work, as well as Marxism, to reorient a critical realist methodology towards a dialectical approach for qualitative research. In particular, the paper demonstrates how dialectical critical realism can begin to provide answers to three common criticisms made against original critical realist methodology: that the qualitative theory of causal powers and structures developed by critical realists is problematic; that critical realist methodology contains values which prove damaging to empirical research; and that critical realists often have difficulties in researching everyday qualitative dilemmas that people face in their daily lives. (shrink)

Sometimes, when a given person and/or his scholarly work are boring, it is intentional: that person is deliberately being boring so that nobody bothers to scrutinize, or therefore discover, the emptiness of either him or his work.

It is explained what it is for a statement to be logically true and it is thereby explained what it is for a statement to be formally true. It is also explained how logical truth differs from formal truth. Further, it is explained what a system of logic is. Finally, the nature of entailment is explained and, in particular, it is explained how formal entailment differs from analytic entailment.

Granting that there is more substance to the idea that we lack freedom than there is to the idea we know nothing about the external world, neither idea has much substance; and the appeal of both ideas, especially of the latter—and doubly especially of the two taken in conjunction---is that they give bureaucrats an excuse to be bureaucrats—to be people who do not know anything and are therefore under no obligation to do anything.

Nach David Hume ist das Konzept der Kausalität und Wahrscheinlichkeit in Begriffen von Ähnlichkeit und Wiederholung zu verstehen. In diesem Buch wird gezeigt, dass Sie in Bezug auf das Konzept der Kontinuität zu verstehen sind. Eine logische Folge ist, dass es keine legitime Grundlage für Skepsis hinsichtlich der Legitimität der induktiven Folgerung gibt. Ein weiterer ist, dass Anti-Realismus über theoretische Entitäten ist undenkbar.

This book states, illustrates, and evaluates the main points of Russell's Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy. This book also contains a thorough exposition of the fundamentals of set theory, including Cantor's groundbreaking investigations into the theory of transfinite numbers. Topics covered include: *Cardinal number (Frege's analysis) *Cardinal number (von Neumann's analysis) *Ordinal number *Isomorphism *Mathematical induction *Limits and continuity *The arithmetic of transfinites *Set-theoretic definitions of "point" and "instant" *An analysis of cardinal n, for arbitrary n, that, unlike the analyses put (...) forth by Russell and von *Neumann, is not merely adequate but de rigueur. *Cogent analyses of hitherto unsolved paradoxes of set-theory and logic, e.g. the Liar Paradox and Russell's Paradox. (shrink)

Unless one has beliefs before having all of the data that would justify those beliefs, one will fail to acquire that data and, moreover, one will be a bureaucratic cripple, who cannot act because he is in a perpetual state of skepticism-induced decision-paralysis.

A fictitious dialogue in which an answer is given to the question: Why are the rates of psychosis and psychopathy in the United States so high?

According to a popular doctrine known as "intentionalism," two experiences must have different representational contents if they have different phenomenological contents; in other words, what they represent must differ if what they feel like differs. Were this position correct, the representational significance of a given affect (or 'quale'---plural 'qualia'--to use the preferred term), e.g. a tickle, would be fixed: what it represented would not be a function of the subject's beliefs, past experiences, or other facts about his past or present (...) psychological condition. To be sure, many a quale has a significance; but it is never a quale's intrinsic properties that assign it that significance, it being quale-external facts about the subject's psychological composition that do so. (An example of such a fact would be a belief on the subject's part to the effect that relevantly similar qualia are consistent with arthritis.). (shrink)

According to one point of view, emotions are recognitions of truths of a certain kind -- most probably valuative truths (truths to the effect that something is good or bad). After giving the standard arguments for this view, and also providing a new argument of my own for it, I set forth two arguments against it. First, this position makes all emotions be epistemically right or wrong. But this view is hard to sustain where certain emotions (especially desire) are concerned. (...) Second, this position is guilty of presupposing what it is meant to explain; for it makes emotions be a pre-requisite for the very value judgments with which emotions are supposed, according to that theory, to be identical. (shrink)

The modern philosophical establishment is a bureaucracy, and all of the philosophy it produces is an attempt to give a sheen of legitimacy to that fact.

At his death in 1945, the influential German philosopher Ernst Cassirer left manuscripts for the fourth and final volume of his magnum opus, _The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms_. John Michael Krois and Donald Phillip Verene have edited these writings and translated them into English for the first time, bringing to completion Cassirer's major treatment of the concept of symbolic form. Ernst Cassirer believed that all the forms of representation that human beings use—language, myth, art, religion, history, science—are symbolic, (...) and the concept of symbolic forms was the basis of his thinking on these subjects. In this volume, which contains one text written in 1928 and another in about 1940, Cassirer presents the metaphysics that is implicit in his epistemology and phenomenology of culture. The earlier text grounds the philosopher's conception of symbolic forms on a notion of human nature that makes a general distinction between Geist and life. In the later text, he discusses Basis Phenomena, an original concept not mentioned in any of his previous works, and he compares his own viewpoint with those of other modern philosophers, notably Bergson and Heidegger. (shrink)

This article is concerned with the question of whether, and to what extent, the concept of metaphor properly applies to pictures (e.g., paintings or photographs). The question is approached dialectically through an examination of the views of Sonia Sedivy, who advances the following 4 claims: (a) that pictures possess propositional content, (b) that there are metaphoric pictures, (c) that metaphoric pictures do not possess metaphoric content, and (d) that there can be no theory of pictorial metaphor. Although the first of (...) Sedivy's claims is rejected in this article, the existence of pictorial metaphors is not denied. Thus, the fact that pictures do not possess propositional content does not preclude the possibility of pictorial metaphors. What are required, though, are changes to the conception of pictorial metaphor that Sedivy advances. (shrink)

In this short work, Cantor's famous 'diagonal' proof of the non-recursivity of the class of real numbers is stated and discussed.

When bad people try to be good, their supposed goodness turns out to be a mere extension of their badness and in fact compounds their badness by giving it a sheen of legitimacy.

Women view hypersexuality on their part as being about not subordinating their sexuality to their prospective wifely and motherly duties. Thus, women see hyper-sexuality on their part as a form of rebelling.

It is made clear what knowledge is and how we acquire it. It is also explained how we can have knowledge of the future, the past, the possible, the imperceptible, and the non-existent. The Gettier problem is solved, and it is proved that we have a priori knowledge, as well as knowledge of non-trivial but purely analytic truths.

Wittgenstein and Brandom both say that knowledge of a language constitutes one's ability to think. Further, they say that a language is an essentially public entity: so to know a language, and to be able to think, consist in one's being embedded in a public practice of some kind. Wittgenstein provides two famous arguments for this: his "private-language" and "rule-following" arguments. Brandom develops these arguments. In this paper, I argue that the Wittgenstein-Brandom view strips anyone of the ability to mean (...) anything by anything. Indeed, it strips anyone of the ability to think at all; the Wittgenstein-Brandom view is really just a version of Pavlov's stimulus-response psychology, and shares all its deficiencies. The rule-following argument is shown to be nothing more than a failure to register the fact that, in certain contexts, epistemic operators can be given either wide or narrow scope with respect to other operators. The private-language argument is shown to be based on a failure to distin-guish the conditions that are causally necessary for language from those that are constitutive of it. Brandom's argument involves a massive over-extension of the concept of a "linguistic community". The result is that his view becomes trivial: anything that can speak or think is by definition a member of a linguistic community; so Brandom's "demonstration" that only encultured beings can think turns out to be an artifact of his definitions. (shrink)

This volume contains lively, yet penetrating examinations of issues of crucial importance, including: the nature of rationality, the different ways in which rationality can be corrupted, the nature of persistence in time, the nature of our knowledge of the future, and the nature of purely conceptual truths and our knowledge thereof.

It is made clear what discursive knowledge is and how we acquire it, and some age-old skeptical views are shown to be incoherent. It is shown that all knowledge is to some degree inferential. At the same time, it is shown that there are three quite distinct senses in which empirical knowledge can be inferential. It is proved that we have a priori knowledge, and also that knowledge of non-empirical truths is needed to acquire empirical knowledge. Finally, it is clearly (...) explained what prediction is, what explanation is, how the two differ, and how they are similar. (shrink)

Neuroses are secondary mental illnesses, it being their purpose to contain psychoses.

Obsessive fears are unconscious desires. The woman who is obsessively afraid that her phone is tapped actually wants her phone to be tapped; that is, she wants someone to pay attention to her. A neurotic fear of such and such is actually an unconscious desire for such and such, this being the topic of this brutally honest exchange.

Some psychoanalytic truths are identified and some of their practical corollaries are identified.

This article discusses ethical implications for the academy in the use of cyberspace and virtual reality in conducting its teaching and research responsibilities. It identifies important cyberspace ethics concerns as they intersect with the academy and provides an ethical framework for coming to grips with them. Topics discussed here include the sine qua non of academic collegiality and civility, concerns about digital alteration of images and sounds, and issues pertaining to academic administration and infrastructure.

This book concisely explicates and evaluates four doctrines concerning the nature of moral obligation: hedonism (one's sole moral obligation is to enjoy oneself); egoism (one's sole moral obligation is to serve one's own interests); consequentialism (the ends justify the means), and deontology (the ends do not justify the means).

It is concisely explained how to conquer OCD.

Some illnesses, e.g. OCD and schizophrenia, corrupt the activity mediated by one's basic psychological framework but do not corrupt that framework itself. But some illnesses, e.g. psychopathy, corrupt that framework itself. Thus, whereas OCD and schizophrenia are structure-internal mental illnesses, psychopathy is a structural mental illness. Structure-internal mental illnesses can be alleviated, but structural mental illnesses cannot.

This is my response to a book, Globalize Liberation, edited by David Solnit and published in 2004. Media activists James John Bell and Patrick Reinsborough sent me a copy and asked for my thoughts about it; the result turned into an essay of some length, which got a certain amount of exposure and discussion online. Looking at the travails of progressive activism since its publication, I find very little that needs revision, except the tone of relative optimism expressed toward (...) the end. (shrink)